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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
DECADES OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY, state fragility, mismanagement, and a series of armed conﬂicts 
have led the Central African Republic (CAR) to a state of widespread violence and poverty. This study 
provides a better understanding of the scope and magnitude of violence in CAR and its consequences, 
as well as a snapshot of what the citizens of CAR believe is the best way to restore peace. It also exam-
ines the issue of justice and accountability for the serious crimes that were committed.
 This report provides the ﬁndings from a survey of 1,879 adults, residents of CAR, randomly se-
lected in the capital city of Bangui, and the prefectures of Lobaye, Ombella M’Poko, Ouham, and Ou-
ham Pende. These prefectures encompass a large geographic area representing 52 percent of the total 
population of CAR and have experienced varying levels of exposure to the conﬂicts. Locally trained 
teams conducted the interviews between November and December 2009. 
 This report provides a detailed analysis of results on a wide range of topics related to the popula-
tion’s priorities and needs, exposure to violence, security, community cohesion and engagement, ac-
cess to information, conﬂict resolution, reintegration of former combatants, transitional justice, and 
reparations for victims. Interviewers used an open-ended format and respondents could provide more 
than one answer to most questions. 
Highlights of the survey’s ﬁndings are as follows:
Building Peace:
 •  Peace, deﬁned by respondents as the absence of violence and freedom from fear, is the main 
priority, followed by concerns over livelihood activities (work) and money. The lack of security 
was highlighted even in daily activities: more than one in four respondents reported feeling un-
safe while walking or sleeping at night, going to the nearest village, or meeting strangers. When 
asked who provides them with security, more than half the respondents (54%) mention God, 
while 3 percent mentioned the police/gendarmes. Given the current dynamic of the conﬂict, 
the sense of insecurity was highest in the northern prefectures of Ouham and Ouham Pende. 
However, many respondents also reported feeling unsafe in Bangui. 
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 •  The population has been exposed to widespread violence and human rights abuses. 
   π  Four out of ﬁve respondents said they had to ﬂee their home at some point during the 
various conﬂicts since 2002. 
   π  About three out of ﬁve had goods or property stolen or destroyed, were separated from 
household members, or thought their lives were threatened.
  Many respondents were also directly exposed to violence: 
   π  Twenty percent said they had been beaten or physically attacked. 
   π  Ten percent said they had been abducted (5% for at least a week). 
   π  Fourteen percent said armed groups forced them to work; 5 percent were forced to loot, 
2 percent to beat someone, and 1 percent to kill someone. 
   π  Over 10 percent of the respondents in the prefectures of Ouham and Ouham Pende 
reported having witnessed pillaging and beating, having been forced to ﬂee their home 
or village, having property stolen or destroyed, and being threatened with death over the 
last 12 months.
   π  Twenty-one percent of all respondents reported witnessing acts of sexual violence by 
armed groups.  
   π  Six percent of the women surveyed reported an experience of sexual violence commit-
ted by armed groups, and 6 percent reported sexual violence committed by perpetrators 
other than armed groups. Sexual violence was most frequently reported by women in 
Ouham Pende (14%), a rate comparable to that found in the eastern Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo.1
 •  In addition to conﬂict-related violence, domestic violence is pervasive: 22 percent of the women 
report having been physically beaten by a household member, most frequently for disobeying 
or arguing. 
 •  Most respondents (61%) identify the root cause of the conﬂict as the struggle for power between 
political elites. Reﬂecting the notion that this is predominantly a political conﬂict, most respon-
dents believe peace must be achieved through dialogue (56%) or by having elections (23%). 
However, there was some pessimism as to whether peace can be achieved; only half the re-
spondents believed it is possible to live in peace in CAR (54%) and with neighboring countries 
1 Vinck P, Pham PN, Baldo S, Shigekane R. Living with Fear: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice 
and Social Reconstruction in Eastern Congo. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley; Payson Center for 
International Development, Tulane University; International Center for Transitional Justice, New York; 2008.
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(50%). One in four did not believe it was possible to have peace. Respondents in the northern 
prefectures were more likely to be pessimistic about prospects for a lasting peace. 
 •  Twenty-three percent of respondents said having free and fair elections was a means for a du-
rable peace. A large majority (94%) said they plan to vote in the next presidential elections, and 
most felt conﬁdent that they would be able to vote freely. 
 •  Respondents expressed high expectations that Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegra-
tion (DDR) programs would contribute to a lasting peace.
 •  Three out of four respondents felt uncomfortable interacting with former combatants in the 
following contexts: sharing a drink or living as neighbors or in the same household. 
 •  A quarter of respondents felt they knew nothing or very little about events in CAR and 41 percent 
said they never listened to the radio, the most common source of information in the country.
Seeking Justice:
 •  The vast majority of respondents (98%) said those responsible for the violence should be held 
accountable. Respondents identiﬁed murder (91%), theft and destruction of property (66%), 
and sexual violence (52%) as the principal crimes committed by combatants. Respondents pro-
vided a long list of individuals or groups that should be held accountable, including current 
and former presidents, and leaders of rebel groups. When asked what should happen to those 
responsible for the violence, 46 percent said they should confront justice, 27 percent said they 
should go to jail, 21 percent said they should be killed with or without judicial proceedings, and 
19 percent said they should be punished. 
 •  When provided with four options for prosecuting those responsible for the violence, over half 
of the respondents (52%) said they should be tried in the national courts while 27 percent said 
they should be tried in CAR by an international court. Fourteen percent preferred international 
trials outside of the country, while 7 percent preferred no trials at all. Thus, in general, respon-
dents clearly prefer trials conducted in CAR. However, only one third of respondents perceived 
the quality of the judicial system as good or very good. These ﬁndings are consistent with those 
found in other post-conﬂict settings where the population wants justice to be proximate to the 
conﬂict in order to witness and participate in the process. 
 •  One third of respondents have heard of the International Criminal Court, with ﬁgures by pre-
fectures ranging from 7 percent in Ouham to 63 percent in Bangui. In general, the perception 
of the Court is positive, with most respondents expecting a positive impact, such as bringing 
justice, and helping prevent crimes.
 •  When asked who the victims of the various armed conﬂicts are, respondents gave the follow-
ing deﬁnitions: the civilian population (75%), women (54%), children (46%), and the elderly 
(25%). When asked what should be done for the victims, they said restitution (60%), followed 
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by money (34%). About half the respondents said reparation should be both individual and 
communal, while 20 percent said it should be only individual. 
 •  It is important to respondents to know the truth about what happened during the conﬂicts, and 
why it happened. Most (74%) also believe memorials are important. 
These results should be instructive to the Government of the Central African Republic, nongovern-
mental organizations, and other agencies as they develop policies to address the legacy of armed con-
ﬂict in CAR. They are also a reminder that consulting the population and deepening our understand-
ing of war-affected communities is essential to build a lasting peace. 
The key recommendations to emerge from this study are:
To the CAR Government and Armed Groups:
 •  Work together to implement the goals of the Inclusive Political Dialogue, including the effective 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants back into society and hold free 
and fair presidential elections. The citizens of CAR view combatant reintegration programs and 
elections as integral steps for building a lasting peace. 
 •  Stop preying on the population and collecting illegal taxes at road blocks. These tactics instill 
fear among the population and hinder their ability to carry on with their daily lives. 
To the CAR Government:
 •  Reform the security sector and remove perpetrators of serious crimes from their positions. The 
police and gendarmes must be trained and supported to fulﬁll their mandate of protecting—not 
preying on—civilians.
 •  Bring those responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law to 
justice. The government should support the judiciary to ensure that courts can operate indepen-
dently and fairly. This will help raise public conﬁdence in the judiciary and supporting the rule 
of law. 
 •  Prioritize the provision of basic services, including education, health care, and transportation 
(e.g., the road network).  
To the Civil Society and the International Community:
 •  Pressure the government, political parties, and armed groups to ensure that elections and DDR 
processes are effectively implemented in a transparent, free, and fair manner. 
 •  Provide sufﬁcient ﬁnancial and technical support to the electoral process to guarantee free and 
fair elections and ensure a peaceful transition. 
 •  Work with the government to rebuild infrastructure and services and uphold the rule of law. 
The focus on humanitarian needs in the north should not prevent investment to address struc-
tural and chronic poverty in all of CAR. Respondents identiﬁed peace, employment, and basic 
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services as priorities. If any of these are neglected, political and physical stability will be hard to 
establish and sustain. 
 •  Engage with the population to address domestic violence and other forms of violence at the 
community level
 •  Continue to document violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and 
press for accountability. The international community should continue to support civil society 
in its efforts to document human rights abuses and assist victims. The international commu-
nity should also maintain a UN peacekeeping mission in CAR for the foreseeable future. Its 
presence will help guarantee a certain level of stability and allow for the completion of DDR, 
elections, and reform of the security sector.
 •  Work to develop a regional security strategy to address cross-border issues and lawless border 
zones. 
To the International Criminal Court:
 •  Increase public information and outreach activities, especially in the interior of the country. The 
proportion of respondents who are aware of the ICC was relatively high, but there is still a great 
need to target groups with little or no access to media.
 •  Reconsider holding in situ proceedings in CAR, security permitting. The survey found strong 
support for local trials. 
 •  Broaden the scope of investigations to include serious crimes committed throughout the coun-
try, especially in the North. 
 •  Work with national institutions to ensure that the investigations contribute to establishing a 
historical record of events in CAR.
6 B U I L D I N G  P E A C E ,  S E E K I N G  J U S T I C E
INTRODUCTION
MANY COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD are locked in a cycle of poverty, conﬂict, and destruction. Few, 
however, have received as little attention as the Central African Republic (CAR). Since its independence 
from France in 1960, CAR has been embroiled in successive military coup attempts and violent power 
transitions, leaving the country fragmented, underdeveloped, and violent.2 The government has had 
little control outside of the capital Bangui, and instability has been aggravated by warlords, rebels, and 
mercenaries, who freely use remote rural areas as bases for their operations.3 Several peacekeeping 
forces and investigations by the International Criminal Court into serious crimes allegedly committed 
in CAR have made international news, but the situation remains relatively unknown, especially com-
pared to conﬂicts in neighboring Darfur and Democratic Republic of Congo. Yet, this is a critical time 
for CAR. Conﬂicts in Darfur and the presence of the Lord’s Resistance Army in the southeast of the 
country highlight the need for a regional approach to security. Internally, the country faces challenges 
to address the presence of several armed groups, hold presidential elections, and disarm, demobilize, 
and reintegrate former combatants. This study provides details regarding the scope and magnitude of 
violence in CAR and its consequences, as well as a snapshot of what the citizens of CAR believe is the 
best way to restore peace and rebuild their country. The goal is to inform the development of policies 
that will affect survivors’ individual and collective lives for years to come.
Short Background to the Conﬂict and Involvement of the ICC
The political situation in CAR has been unstable since its independence from France in 1960, marked 
by four coups d’état and many more failed attempts.4 The most recent coup occurred in 2003 when 
Francois Bozizé seized power from Ange-Félix Patassé. Patassé had won multi-party presidential elec-
tions in 1993. His presidency, however, was marked by a series of military coup attempts prompting 
2 International Crisis Group. Africa Brieﬁng N°69: Central African Republic: Keeping the Dialogue Alive. Nairobi/Brussels: 
ICG, 2010; Berman EG, Lombard LN The Central African Republic and Small Arms. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008.
3 International Crisis Group. Africa Report N°136: Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State. Nairobi/Brussels: 
ICG, 2007.
4 Berman, EG et al.
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the involvement of a small UN force. In 1999, Patassé was reelected but failed to unite the various 
armed groups and political factions, opening the path for a new wave of violence. 
 In 2001, former President Kolingba tried to seize power, prompting Patassé to seek assistance 
from Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the Ugandan-backed rebel group, the Mouvement de Liberation 
du Congo (MLC).5 The MLC had been active in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
occupying most of the northern part of the country bordering CAR. Ultimately, the coup failed. In 
the aftermath, Patassé accused his chief of staff Bozizé of disloyalty. Bozizé then ﬂed to Chad but re-
turned a year later to oust Patassé. Bozizé’s troops quickly reached the capital of Bangui, resulting in 
heavy ﬁghting. In order to contain the invading forces, Patassé again requested help from Jean-Pierre 
Bemba. Bemba’s Banyamulenge troops pushed the rebel back to the north, but in the process commit-
ted mass atrocities against civilians. Ultimately, however, Bozizé was successful and seized power in 
2003. Bozizé held power in a transitional government and was then elected president through general 
elections in 2005 in a contentious political process.
 To this day, however, instability continues unabated, with various active rebel groups, mainly in the 
northern part of the country. Soon after the 2005 elections, violence broke out again in the northwest, 
causing the displacement of more than 100,000 civilians.6 Among the armed groups involved, the 
Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD) was the most prominent, 
with members of Patassé’s former presidential guard and local self-defense groups seeking security for 
their communities. Aside from the political power struggle, the rebellion in the northwest is fuelled 
by the situation of chronic insecurity, where civilians decided to take up arms against bandits known 
as zaraguinas who have preyed on the villages for years.7 APRD’s main targets have been government 
installations and its forces have been responsible for kidnapping, extortion, forced recruitment of chil-
dren, and looting. CAR’s presidential guard responded by carrying out a “dirty war” against the rebels, 
which has resulted in attacks on the civilian population, burning thousands of civilian homes, and 
summary executions.8
 In 2006, violence in the northeast of the country broke out as a second rebellion was lead by an-
other former associate of Patassé, Damane Zakaria, now chief of The Union of Democratic Forces for 
Unity (UFDR). The UFDR seized several towns, while the government of CAR accused Sudan of being 
behind these attacks.9 The violence resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths and led to widespread burn-
ing of homes, looting, summary executions, and the use of child soldiers.10
5 Kolingba was president of CAR between 1981 and 1993. He seized power from Dacko through a coup and lost it to 
Patassé in the 1993 presidential elections. 
6 Peter Bouckaert, Olivier Bercault and Human Rights Watch, State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses Against Civilians. 
New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2007. UN OCHA Central African Republic Fact Sheet, June 2007.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 CAR Rebels Seize Town Near Chad, BBC NEWS, sec. 2009, 30 October 2006 (accessed October 23, 2009).
10 Bouckaert, Bercault and Human Rights Watch, State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses Against Civilians.
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 After years of continuous ﬁghting, the country saw signs of progress toward ending the conﬂict 
in June 2008 when UFDR and APRD signed a peace agreement with the government to disarm and 
demobilize their soldiers.11 Parliament approved amnesty legislation later that year, which covers vio-
lence from 15 March 2003.12 Although the Amnesty Act does not cover international crimes as deﬁned 
by the ICC, it does extend amnesty for serious crimes committed by Bozizé’s army and presidential 
guard, the CAR rebel groups, and a more limited scope of potential crimes committed by Ange-Félix 
Patassé and several of his associates.13 In December 2008, the CAR government and rival rebel groups 
ratiﬁed a resolution to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission; however the mechanisms for 
its implementation are yet to be deﬁned. More recently, the process culminated with the creation of a 
national unity government incorporating two rebel leaders in early 2009.14 
INVOLVEMENT OF THE ICC
During 2002 and 2003, widespread violence committed by all parties, including Bemba’s troops, 
prompted local human rights organizations afﬁliated with the International Federation for Human 
Rights to investigate serious crimes in the most affected neighbourhoods of the capital.15 The evidence 
was sent to the newly established ICC to suggest investigation, and in December 2004 the government 
of CAR ofﬁcially referred the situation to the Court. The Prosecutor opened an investigation in May 
2007. In May of the following year the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued the ﬁrst arrest warrant in the 
situation of CAR, against Jean-Pierre Bemba.16 Bemba, travelling in Belgium at the time, was arrested 
the day after the warrant was unsealed and was subsequently transferred to The Hague. In 2009, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber conﬁrmed charges of two crimes against humanity (rape and murder) and three 
war crimes (rape, murder, and pillage), as a military leader. To date, he is the only person facing trial in 
the situation of CAR. The trial is set to start in 2010.
The Study
OBJECTIVES
Since 2007, the Initiative for Vulnerable Populations at UC Berkeley’s Human Rights Center has un-
dertaken research to document the experience of conﬂict-affected populations and give voice to survi-
11 International Crisis Group, Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue, 2008.
12 Thijs Bouwknegt. Central African Republic: amnesty for peace. Radio Netherlands Worldwide, http://static.rnw.nl/migratie
/www.rnw.nl/internationaljustice/icc/CAR/080930-car-amnesty-redirected (September 30, 2008).
13 International Center for Transitional Justice, Regional Dynamics in Central Africa: Confronting Past Crimes at the National 
Level, www.ictj.org/static/Factsheets/ICTJ_CAR_fs2009.pdf (accessed October 23, 2009).
14 Touadera Names Rebels in New Central African Republic Govt, AFP, sec. 2008, 9 December 2008 (accessed October 23, 2009).
15 Marlies Glasius, We ourselves, we are part of the Functioning: The ICC, Victims, and Civil Society in the Central African 
Republic, African Affairs, 108 (430) 2008: 49-67. International Federation for Human Rights. War Crimes in the Central 
African Republic: ‘When the Elephants Fight, the Grass Suffers’. Paris: IFHR; 2003.
16 International Criminal Court, Prosecutor opens investigation in the Central African Republic (The Hague: ICC Press 
Release, 2007).
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vors of mass violence. The survey in CAR aimed to capture opinions and attitudes about the impact of 
past and ongoing conﬂicts on the population and attitudes about peace, justice, and social reconstruc-
tion. The speciﬁc objectives of the survey were to: 
 •  Assess the overall exposure to violence among the population as a result of war and human 
rights abuses, as well as incidents of domestic violence, since 2002
 •  Understand the priorities and needs of civilians affected by the armed conﬂict 
 •  Measure the sense of security and levels of protection perceived by the population
 •  Examine social cohesion and community participation
 •  Capture attitudes about peace and social reconstruction, including the reintegration of former 
combatants
 •  Capture opinions and attitudes about different conﬂict-resolution and justice mechanisms, in-
cluding perceptions of the national court system and the International Criminal Court
 The methodology and objectives of the study are similar to other studies conducted by the Initia-
tive in Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda. However, the questionnaire and 
methodology reﬂect the speciﬁcity of the nature and concerns prevailing in CAR at the time of the 
survey. The research ﬁndings are aimed at supporting nongovernmental organizations, government 
and international agencies, and local and international courts in developing a strategic response to the 
violence and humanitarian crisis in CAR.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE
This report is based on a cross-sectional survey of adult residents in ﬁve administrative regions of the 
Central African Republic: the capital city Bangui, and the prefectures of Lobaye, Ombella M’Poko, Ou-
ham, and Ouham Pende. The four prefectures and Bangui were selected to reﬂect the range of experi-
ence of conﬂicts in the CAR and to provide geographic representation from North to South. Together, 
they account for over half the population of CAR (52%). 
 Within each region, we used a systematic random selection method to sample villages propor-
tionately to the population size, then households, and ﬁnally individuals, for interviews. Villages were 
randomly selected from a comprehensive list of villages for each selected prefecture using the 2003 
general population census data.17 A total of 117 villages were selected, and 6 villages had to be replaced 
by the nearest accessible village because of local instability or inaccessibility.
 Within the villages, interviewers were assigned to zones where they selected every other household 
in a randomly chosen direction, starting from the center of the zone. In each household, deﬁned as a 
group of people normally sleeping under the same roof and eating together, interviewers randomly se-
lected one adult to be interviewed from a list of all eligible adults. Three attempts were made to contact 
a household or individual before replacing them with another. 
17 3ème Recensement Général de la Population et de l’Habitation de 2003 (RGPH03).
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 The minimum sample size for each of the prefectures and Bangui was 352 individuals, for a total 
sample size of 1,760. Out of 2,192 households approached for interviews, 1,879 agreed to participate 
(86% participation rate). Within these 1,879 households, a total of 1,969 individuals were approached, 
and 1,879 participated in the interviews (95% participation rate, one individual selected per participat-
ing household). 
 The Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at the University of California, Berkeley, 
reviewed and approved the study protocol in October 2009. In CAR, where no similar review board ex-
ists, the protocol was reviewed and approved by the Ministry of Economy, Planning, and International 
Cooperation. Approval to conduct interviews was also obtained from the local authorities at each survey 
site. Informed consent was sought for each selected participant; neither monetary nor material incen-
tives were offered for participation.
RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS
Interviews were conducted using a standardized semi-structured questionnaire covering (1) respon-
dents’ demographics, (2) priorities and services, (3) health, (4) social cohesion and community rela-
tions, (5) security and conﬂict resolution, (6) domestic violence, (7) peace, (8) justice and accountability, 
(9) the International Criminal Court, (10) non-judicial measures for victims and reparations, (11) ex-
posure to violence, and (12)  psychological impact of the conﬂicts. The questionnaire was developed by 
experts in the ﬁeld and after consultation with local experts. Response options based on pilot interviews 
were provided to the interviewer for coding but were never read to study participants with the exception 
of questions employing a scaling format (e.g., Likert scale). An open-ended ﬁeld was always available 
to record complete responses. 
 The questionnaire and consent doc-
uments were ﬁrst developed in French 
and then independently translated into 
Sango, the primary local language spo-
ken throughout the country. An inde-
pendent back-translation and pilot sur-
veys were used to ﬁnalize and validate 
the instruments. Once the question-
naire was ﬁnalized, it was programmed 
into a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) 
using KoBo, our custom data collection 
package.18 The use of PDAs allows enumerators to enter the data directly as they conduct interviews. 
The forms contain a built-in veriﬁcation system that reduces the risk of skipping questions or entering 
erroneous values, resulting in higher quality of data. Daily synchronization with a central computer 
allows the lead researchers to check data for consistency and outliers during data collection.
18 Since 2007, the Human Rights Center has been developing tools to facilitate electronic data collection.
figure 1: digital data collection
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DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Data collection took place during six weeks between November and December 2009. Five teams of two 
men and two women, for a total of twenty interviewers, implemented the study under the guidance of 
the lead researchers. The interviewers were university students or professionals with research experi-
ence. Prior to data collection, they participated in an eight-day training workshop that covered the study 
objectives and content, survey and interview techniques, use of the PDA, and trouble-shooting and 
solving technical problems.19 The training included mock interviews and pilot-testing with randomly 
selected individuals at non-sampled sites.
 At the survey sites, each interviewer was expected to conduct four interviews per day, each lasting 
an average of one hour. One-on-one interviews were conducted anonymously in a conﬁdential setting. 
Due to the sensitivity of some of the questions, the interviewers were assigned to same-sex respon-
dents. Upon selection of study participants, oral rather than written informed consent was obtained 
because of the high illiteracy rate in CAR. After data collection, the data were imported for analysis 
with the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS). All the results presented here accounted for the 
complex sampling methodology and weight factors.
LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations inherent to the method and context of the study. The sample was designed 
to be representative of the region under study, not for the whole of CAR, since only part of the country 
was included in the survey. Some villages, households, and individuals had to be replaced, and it is un-
known how the individuals replaced might differ from those interviewed. In addition, it is possible that 
responses were inﬂuenced by inaccurate recall, social desirability, and concerns over safety in areas 
affected by armed conﬂict. The training, use of a consent form, anonymous interviews, conﬁdentiality, 
supervision, and quality control were all designed to reduce biases and errors. Constructs and termi-
nology used for this study were not deﬁned or explained to the participants to avoid inﬂuencing them. 
As a result, they were free to interpret those concepts based on their own understanding. To address 
this limitation, we asked respondents to deﬁne key concepts (e.g., peace, justice), and throughout the 
questionnaire, we carefully chose phrasing and translation that would avoid misunderstanding. 
19 The PDAs are designed to be used by surveyors with no or little computer experience. 
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RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS
THE SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED in the capital city, Bangui, and four out of sixteen prefectures: Lobaye, 
Ombella M’Poko, Ouham and Ouham Pende. The prefectures were selected to reﬂect the range of ex-
perience of armed conﬂict in CAR and to provide a geographic unity from North to South. Other areas 
affected by conﬂict were not included in this study but should be considered for future research. A total 
of 1,879 interviews were conducted in 117 villages and neighborhoods. The results are representative 
for the population at the prefecture level.
 The interview teams were composed of equal numbers of men and women and were assigned 
to same-sex respondents. The mean age of respondents was 36 years. The ethnic composition of the 
sample is broad, with the largest groups being the Gbaya (24%), Karre (14%), Banda (11%), and Manza 
figure 2: sample distribution
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(9%). The ethnic composition varied greatly across prefectures, as illustrated in the following ﬁgure. 
The majority of respondents described themselves as married or in a partnership (75%), 12 percent re-
ported being single and never having been married, while 8 percent were widowed and 6 percent were 
divorced. 
 The average level of education was low, with 25 percent of respondents reporting no formal educa-
tion, and 29 percent reporting incomplete primary education. The literacy level found in this survey 
(50%) is consistent with nationwide alphabetization rate estimate (44% in 2008), and below the re-
gional average for sub-Saharan Africa (62% for the 2000-2007 period).20 Educational achievements 
were lowest in the northern prefectures of Ouham and Ouham Pende, where over 75 percent reported 
no or incomplete primary education. Those two prefectures also claimed the highest proportion of 
asset-poor households.21 The data suggested that more than 30 percent of the respondents were asset 
poor in Ouham and Ouham Pende, compared to 10 percent or less in Bangui, Lobaye, and Ombella 
M’Poko. 
Bangui Lobaye Ombella 
M’Poko
Ouham Ouham 
Pende
Total
Sex (% women) 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Age 36.7 36.3 36.0 35.9 36.7 36.4
Matrimonial 
Status
Married, partner 64% 79% 75% 81% 82% 75%
Single, never married 20% 10% 11% 6% 6% 12%
Widow(er) 8% 7% 7% 10% 8% 8%
Divorced 8% 4% 7% 4% 4% 6%
Education level None 6% 23% 19% 48% 41% 25%
Incomplete primary 19% 36% 31% 30% 36% 29%
Complete primary 14% 18% 14% 10% 7% 12%
Secondary incomplete 39% 19% 28% 10% 15% 24%
Secondary complete 10% 2% 5% 0% 1% 5%
Technical/Professional school 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
University or higher 10% 1% 2% 0% 0% 4%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Literacy % read yes 79% 44% 51% 23% 33% 50%
Assets % poorest quintile 1% 10% 6% 39% 33% 17%
20 Enquête Centrafricaine pour le Suivi Evaluation du Bien être (ECASEB), Institut Centrafricain des Statistiques et des 
Etudes Economiques et Sociales, 2008; State of the World’s Children, UNICEF, 2009.
21 Asset poverty is a common measure of poverty based on ownership of a set of common household items. In this 
study, we assessed ownership of 9 items. Respondents could have a score ranging from 0 (no items owned) to 9 (all items 
owned). Asset poor are deﬁned as the respondents among the lowest quintile of asset ownership. While it is not a measure 
of absolute poverty, the indicator suggests the geographic distribution of poverty. It does not, however, allow for cross-
country comparisons because the set of assets may vary. 
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Ethnicity Gbaya 22% 30% 16% 42% 16% 24%
Karre 2% 1% 1% 0% 60% 14%
Banda 20% 4% 7% 15% 1% 11%
Manza (Mandja, Mandjia) 18% 2% 15% 5% 1% 9%
Gbanou 3% 2% 27% 2% 1% 6%
Yakoma 15% 2% 3% 0% 0% 5%
Kaba 3% 1% 3% 6% 11% 5%
Dagba 1% 0% 1% 24% 0% 5%
Ngbaka-Bantou 3% 20% 6% 0% 0% 4%
Mbati 2% 14% 4% 0% 0% 3%
Mboum 1% 0% 0% 0% 7% 2%
Ali 0% 4% 7% 1% 0% 2%
Bati 1% 11% 1% 1% 0% 2%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
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BUILDING PEACE
BUILDING A LASTING PEACE ANYWHERE requires the establishment of security, a legitimate govern-
ment, institutional reforms to protect civil liberties and the rule of law, revitalization of the economy 
and civil society, and the promotion of social reconstruction and reconciliation.22 In this section, we 
discuss individuals’ exposure to violence and their perception of various processes that con-
tribute to building a sustainable peace. 
Priorities: Peace First
To better understand respondents’ opinions of the way to move toward peace, we ﬁrst asked them to de-
ﬁne their current top priority. Reﬂecting the ongoing political instability and conﬂict, peace is the most 
frequently mentioned priority (32%). When asked about the meaning of peace, respondents deﬁne it 
as a broad social concept that goes beyond the absence of violence and includes the absence of fear 
(47%), living together united (39%), freedom (34%), having basic needs fulﬁlled (29%), the absence of 
violence (26%), a good economy (21%), and health and education services (15%).
22 Nicole Ball, “The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies,” in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing Interna-
tional Conﬂicts, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 2001).
figure 3: respondents’ top priorities
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 Livelihood concerns are also frequently mentioned among respondents’ top priorities, including 
money (23%), work (16%), and services including health (6%) and education (5%). These priorities 
reﬂect respondents’ current living conditions and lack of access to social services. Many of the villages 
sampled in the survey lacked infrastructure or supplies and had no ofﬁcial teachers. When asked 
to rank a range of services, few respondents found them good or very good. Only one-third of them 
ranked their access to water as good or very good. One in four or less ranked their access to education 
and health services as good or very good. Indeed, while such services are generally available in urban 
center and large villages, they are often lacking or of poor quality in rural areas. 
Security and Exposure to Violence
SECURITY
Many respondents included “absence of violence” (26%) and “freedom from fear” (47%) in their deﬁ-
nition of peace. This ﬁnding suggests that increasing security and restoring a sense of safety must 
be part of any peace-building effort. Respondents continue to report insecurity and a lack a safety or 
protection. They were asked to rank their perceived physical safety in a range of daily situations, from 
“very good” to “very bad.” The highest percentages of respondents reporting “bad” or “very bad” safety 
in the proposed situations were found in Ouham and Ouham Pende. In Ouham Pende, up to 46 per-
cent reported a bad or very bad sense of safety walking at night in their village. High percentages of 
bad or very bad reported safety in the proposed situations were also found in the capital city, Bangui. 
The situations in which respondents most frequently reported a “poor” or “very poor” sense of safety 
include walking at night in the city/village, meeting strangers, and going to the nearest village or town. 
 When asked who provides them with security, 54 percent of respondents reported “God.” Respon-
dents were allowed more than one answer, and 15 percent mentioned themselves. Half of the respon-
dents (46%) only mentioned God, themselves, or nobody as providing security. Clearly the security sec-
tor has failed to provide protection. Less than half (45%) mentioned government forces including the 
government itself (21%), the Presidential/Republican Guard (Guarde Presidentielle / Republicaines 
[GP/GR], 13%), the Central African Armed Forces (Forces Armées Centrafricaines [FACA], 15%), and 
the Police/Gendarmes (3%). 
figure 4: ranking of services (% good – very good)
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EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE
Respondents’ perceived lack of security is reinforced by their frequent exposure to violent events. The 
following ﬁgure illustrates respondents’ exposure to a list of 24 traumatic events. Among respondents, 
76 percent reported witnessing at least one violent event committed by armed groups: 64 percent had 
witnessed pillaging, 59 percent had witnessed combat, 54 percent had witnessed beatings, 35 percent 
had witnessed killing, and 21 percent had witnessed sexual violence. 
 A large number of respondents reported direct experience related to the conﬂict, including dis-
placement (79%) and forced separation from household members (56%). Fewer had direct experience 
of violence, including being physically attacked, beaten, or tortured (20%), being held prisoner by 
armed groups (11%), or being abducted (10%). Respondents also reported coercion by armed groups: 
14 percent reported they were forced to work, 5 percent reported they were forced to participate in 
pillaging, and 2 percent reported they had been forced to beat someone. All the events were more fre-
quently reported in the northern prefectures of Ouham and Ouham Pende. 
figure 5: self reported poor or very poor sense of safety (%)
figure 6: protection
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 Among all respondents, 4 percent reported having experienced sexual violations committed by 
armed groups, and the same percentage (4%) reported sexual violence by individuals other than armed 
groups. Reports of sexual violence by armed groups was signiﬁcantly higher among women (6%) 
compared to men (1%). Sexual violence was especially prevalent in Ouham Pende, where 14 percent 
figure 7: exposure to violence
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of the women reported having experienced it. Beyond the physical and direct violence, two-thirds of 
respondents (65%) reported thinking they would die at some point during the conﬂict.
 Incidence data further show the ongoing nature of the violence, especially in the prefectures of 
Ouham and Ouham Pende. In those prefectures, over 10 percent of the respondents reported having 
witnessed pillaging and beating, having been forced to ﬂee their home or village, having property sto-
len or destroyed, and being threatened with death over the last 12 months. These data show that civil-
ians in CAR, as in other places affected by mass violence, have paid a high toll during the successive 
conﬂicts. This survey documents for the ﬁrst time the extent of the violence.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In addition to exposure to conﬂict-related violence, the survey asked respondents about their experi-
ence of domestic violence. Fourteen percent of respondents reported they had already been seriously 
physically beaten by someone from their household. However, the results show great gender disparity: 
22 percent of the women reported serious physical beating by a household member compared to 4 
percent of the men. 
 Among women, the main reason reported for the beatings were disobeying (42%), arguing (30%), 
jealousy (12%), serving dinner late (8%), and alcohol (8%). 
figure 8: domestic violence
figure 9: reasons for domestic violence
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 Respondents were further asked under what circumstances a serious physical beating of a house-
hold member would be acceptable. Over half respondents (58%) found no circumstances would justify 
such beating. One-third of respondents said it would be acceptable to beat a household member who 
disobeyed (33%) or those who argue or insult (17%). Only a minority said a beating would be accept-
able for cheating (4%), serving dinner late (1%), or burning the food (<1%). As many as 39 percent of 
respondents said they themselves had severely beaten a household member in such conditions. It is 
important to note that this includes spousal abuse and the beating of children. This may explain why 
44 percent of the women had been involved in seriously beating a household member.
Achieving Peace
ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICTS
As discussed above, peace is the most frequently cited priority among study respondents. In order to 
understand the population’s perception of what needs to be done to achieve peace, we ﬁrst need to un-
derstand what, in their opinion, are the root causes of the conﬂict. For a majority (61%), the root cause 
is ﬁghting over power among the political elites. About a third (33%) believed the conﬂict to be rooted 
in poverty, and 22 percent mentioned ethnic divisions. Respondents were allowed to provide several 
answers and a range of other causes, often interlinked, including exploitation of natural resources, 
money, and access to land were identiﬁed. The respondents’ perceived root causes of the conﬂicts are 
consistent with the literature that accuses “the militarization of [CAR] politics and the ethnic exclusive-
ness of successive governments.”23 At the same time structural problems, including deep poverty, are 
also identiﬁed as root causes of violence. 
23 International Crisis Group. Africa Report N°136: Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State. Nairobi/Brussels: 
ICG; 2007.
figure 10: perceived root causes of the conflicts
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MEANS FOR PEACE
Next, we asked respondents if they believed it is possible for the people in CAR to live together peace-
fully or to live peacefully with neighboring countries. For both questions, about one half of the popula-
tion responded afﬁrmatively, but nearly one in four respondents did not believe it was possible. The 
rest were uncertain. Perhaps because of the chronic security and economic problems in the north, 
respondents in Ouham and Ouham Pende generally felt least conﬁdent that peace is possible.
Is it possible for people in CAR to live 
together peacefully? (% total)
Is it possible to live peacefully
with neighboring countries? (% total)
When asked what needs to be done to achieve lasting peace in CAR, over half of respondents men-
tioned political dialogue was needed, 23 percent mentioned elections, 17 percent mentioned that armed 
groups need to be disarmed, 16 percent said there needs to be some sort of reconciliation or rebuilding 
of unity, and 9 percent said political power should be shared. Few supported a military solution. 
figure 12: means to achieve peace
figure 11: acheiving peace
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ELECTIONS AND PARTICIPATION IN SOCIETY
Holding free and fair elections and respecting civil and political rights have been core elements of con-
temporary peace-building practices. However, elections can also drive parties apart rather than recon-
cile them.24 Considering CAR’s history of coups, counter-coups and recurrent violence, elections pres-
ent a risky situation. Presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled in CAR in 2010. Struggles 
for political power have been a root cause of the violence here, yet many respondents see elections and 
changes in government as a step toward building peace. 
 A large majority of respondents (94%) plan to vote in the upcoming elections. Those who plan 
to vote say they will do so because it is their duty (38%), because they have to elect someone who will 
help the country (34%), or because elections will help bring peace and security (12%). Those who did 
not plan to vote claim they simply did not want to (28%), that it was useless (33%), and/or that they are 
not interested in politics (15%). Intentions to vote are consistent with actual voting behavior during the 
2005 presidential elections. A majority of respondents (80%) said they voted in 2005 and those who 
did not were most frequently too young to have voted (39%). Most voters also felt conﬁdent they would 
be free to choose whom to vote for: 77 percent said they would be totally free, and 15 percent said they 
would be somewhat free to do so. Only 8 percent said they would not be free at all, or not very free to 
choose whom to vote for. 
 The survey also explored respondents’ involvement in their community and society as a whole. 
Strengthening social ties within communities and between individuals and the state is critical to the 
transition from war to peace.25 Overall, 85 percent of respondents reported being part of a group or as-
sociation. The majority of them were members of a church or religious group (84%). The second most 
frequent type of group or association was farmers’ associations, with 17 percent of the respondents 
reporting being part of such a group. Farmers’ associations were especially frequent in Ouham Pende 
(42%). Other groups included youth groups (9%), women’s associations (9%), political organizations 
(8%), and loan/credit groups (5%). Most respondents felt totally free (70%) or somewhat free (20%) to 
join any organization, while 10 percent felt not very free (6%) or not free at all (4%) to do so. However, 
respondents experienced freedom of expression less frequently. Only 43 percent felt totally free to say 
what they want. Freedom of expression was least frequently reported in Bangui, Ouham, and Ouham 
Pende, possibly because of the ongoing conﬂict and presence of armed groups.
 While respondents reported active engagement in society, only one in four (28%) reported having 
contacted a leader of any sort (local, political, civil society, etc). In over half the cases (58%), respondents 
contacted a religious leader, while 24 percent contacted the local village chief, 14 percent contacted re-
gional leaders such as a mayor, prefect, or deputy, and 14 percent contacted other government ofﬁcials 
(12%). The subject matter of the contacts between individuals and leaders was not explored.
24 Paris R. “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn, 
1997), 54-89; Paris R. “International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’,” Review of International Studies (2002), 
28, 637–56.
25 Colletta, J. J. & Cullen, M. L. Violent Conﬂict and the Transformation of Social Capital. Washington, DC: International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2000.
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LOCAL CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
While the exposure to violence and peace-building questions were related to the large-scale conﬂict in 
CAR, this study also explored respondents’ experience of local conﬂicts. One in four (25%) respondents 
mentioned having experienced some sort of conﬂict over the one-year period prior to the survey. Most 
of those reporting conﬂicts said the nature of the local disputes were domestic (48%) or concerned 
relations with neighbors (13%). Fewer than 10 percent reported conﬂict over theft (9%), building (7%), 
money lending/borrowing (6%), and land (5%). The conﬂicts were most frequently resolved within 
the family (40%), followed by the village chief (29%) or by religious leaders (15%). Police (5%) and the 
judicial system (4%) were rarely mentioned. Furthermore, the data on local conﬂicts and conﬂict reso-
lution showed little variation across prefectures. 
DDR AND PERCEPTION OF FORMER COMBATANTS
Former belligerents must be disarmed before progress toward peace can be made.26 Yet, the demobili-
zation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants has been a challenging process. 
At the time of the survey, a DDR process had been initiated as a way to end the rebellions in the north, 
however, it has experienced several delays, causing tension between armed groups and the govern-
ment. Still, some respondents held high expectations that the DDR process will contribute to peace: 
17 percent mention disarmament as part of the means to achieve peace. The survey further asked re-
spondents to rank their level of comfort in the presence of former combatants, regardless of the armed 
group they were afﬁliated with, in a range of hypothetical situations that reﬂect common daily events. 
 Overall, respondents were least comfortable sharing a drink with former combatants: 83 percent 
said they would be uncomfortable in that situation. In-depth interviews showed this was due ﬁrst to the 
social function of sharing a drink, seen as a sign of cooperation and cohesion, and second to the fear 
that former combatants would become violent under the inﬂuence of alcohol. Respondents also fre-
quently felt uncomfortable living in the same household (75%) or living as close neighbors (72%). Over 
half the respondents also felt uncomfortable having former combatants marry a household member 
(61%), working with former combatants (59%), sharing a meal (57%), and going to the same market 
26 Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, “Making Peace Settlements Work,” Foreign Policy, No. 104 (Autumn, 
1996), 54–71.
figure 13: self-reported freedom of expression
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(51%). The least stigmatizing situations were those where direct contact may not be necessary as when 
former combatants go to the same school (39%) or the same church (30%) as the respondents or their 
children. There were no or few differences across prefectures. 
 The results further suggest that while some respondents have high expectations for DDR, reinte-
gration of former combatants in the community will not be easy. Interventions are needed to address 
the overall level of comfort interacting with former combatants in various settings and ensure that 
bridges are built between the community and former combatants. One possible strategy of the DDR 
program is to build education or outreach programs. A second strategy is to develop a community-
based program that would provide the population opportunity to interact with former combatant in a 
non-threatening scenario. A third possible strategy is to develop an economic program that would 
include both former combatants and community members, permitting both to beneﬁt from the DDR 
programs without the perception of favoring former combatants. 
Information
Media is increasingly recognized for its potential role in peacebuilding and social marketing.27 The 
study included several questions on access to media, consumption habits, and perception of the vari-
ous sources of information. A quarter of respondents (24%) felt they were not at all informed about 
27 Spurk, C. “Media and peacebuilding: Concepts, actors and challenges,” SwissPeace Working Paper Series; 2002.
figure 14: respondents’ perceived level of 
comfort towards former combatants
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events and news about CAR, while about half (48%) said they were moderately informed, and 28 per-
cent said they were very informed. They generally felt more informed about what happened at the local 
level, with 44 percent saying they were very informed, 43 percent moderately informed, and 13 percent 
not informed. 
Main Source Bangui Lobaye Ombella 
M’Poko
Ouham Ouham 
Pende
Total
Radio 72% 50% 61% 26% 33%
Friends, neighbors 19% 39% 32% 60% 53%
Local leaders 0% 8% 5% 5% 6%
Religious leaders 1% 2% 2% 2% 5%
Television 5% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Print media 2% 0% 0% 0% 1%
Other 1% 1% 0% 7% 2%
 The primary sources of information were the radio (51%) or friends and neighbors (38%). Fewer 
respondents identiﬁed local (4%), or religious leaders (2%), the television (2%), print media (1%) or 
other sources as their primary sources of information. However, radio was less frequently the primary 
source of information in the northern prefectures of Ouham and Ouham Pende, a reﬂection of the 
prevailing poverty, with fewer households owning or having access to a radio.
 When asked speciﬁcally about access to the radio, 41 percent of respondents said they never lis-
tened to a radio, and 59 percent indicated listening to a radio at least occasionally (36% on a daily basis). 
Respondents listened most frequently to the radio in the morning (5:00 to 10:00, 76%), and late after-
noon (16:00 to 18:00, 52%). Compared to other prefectures, fewer respondents reported listening to a 
radio in the northern prefectures of Ouham and Ouham Pende (35% in both prefectures), and among 
those who did, few listened to a radio on a daily basis (approx. 40%). 
Radio Listening – Frequency Time of Day
 
figure 15: main source of information
figure 16: radio listening habits
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 The most popular radio stations are Radio Centrafrique and Radio Ndeke Luka (respectively 66% 
and 62% of the respondents who listen to radio report listening to those radio stations). A quarter of 
the respondents listened to Radio Nehemie (24%) and RFI (23%). Over 10 percent of the respondents 
identify Afrique #1 (20%), and Radio ICDI (13%) as their radio of choice. Other radio stations were 
mentioned, some with regional importance. Radio Maria, for example, was favored by only 4 percent 
of the respondents overall, but was the preferred station in Ouham prefecture (34%).
 The main type of radio programs people listened to is news broadcasts: 88 percent of those listen-
ing to a radio reported listening to the news. Other frequently mentioned programs include religious 
programs (36%); programs on democracy, peace, and justice (36%); announcements (35%); and pro-
grams on health (35%), and music or entertainment (31%). 
 As outlined above, newspapers and print media were seldom identiﬁed as the primary source of 
information. Nevertheless, 20 percent of those interviewed reported reading a newspaper at least oc-
casionally: 3 percent read it on a daily basis, 7 percent read it more than once a week, 5 percent read it 
once a week, and 5 percent read it less than once a week. Reading newspapers was especially frequent 
in Bangui (45%) and to a lesser extent in Ombella M’Poko (18%) and Lobaye (11%). In Ouham and 
Ouham Pende, less than 10 percent of respondents reported reading a newspaper at least occasion-
ally. This is likely due both to the low availability of newspapers and high level of illiteracy. Among 
those who read a newspaper, in Bangui, the most frequently read newspapers were Le Citoyen (60%), 
Le Conﬁdent (36%), and L’Hirondelle (22%). Le Citoyen was also read by over 50 percent of those read-
ing newspapers in Ombella M’Poko and Lobaye. In Ouham and Ouham Pende, respondents reported 
reading mainly religious pamphlets and publications. 
 Overall, only 2 percent of the respondents identiﬁed television as their main source of information. 
However, 26 percent reported watching television at least occasionally, which is more than the number 
of respondents reading newspapers at least occasionally. Again, regional differences were important 
with 58 percent of those living in Bangui reporting watching television occasionally compared to 22 
percent in Ombella M’Poko, 17 percent in Lobaye, 7 percent in Ouham Pende, and 3 percent in Ouham.
 Finally, respondents were asked to rank their level of trust in the media on a scale from no trust at 
all to extremely trustful. The question was only asked to those using the media. Among those listening 
to the radio, 43 percent trusted it a lot or extremely. Among newspaper readers, fewer trusted it a lot or 
extremely (29%).
 
figure 17: trust in media
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SEEKING JUSTICE
Accountability, Justice, and Forgiveness
ACCOUNTABILITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD ALLEGED PERPETRATORS
Although accountability and justice were infrequently mentioned as top priorities (1%), nearly all re-
spondents (98%) still believe it is important to hold accountable those responsible for the violence 
committed during the conﬂicts. This is consistent with what we have found in other studies. For exam-
ple, in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 2 percent mentioned justice in their priorities, and 
85 percent believed it is important to hold accountable those responsible for the violence.28 In north-
ern Uganda, justice was mentioned as a priority by 3 percent of the population; however, 70 percent 
maintain that it is important to hold accountable those responsible for the violence.29 These ﬁndings 
highlight that while peace, security, and basic needs may be perceived as priorities, accountability is 
nevertheless important to those who experienced conﬂict. In CAR, when asked why accountability was 
important, the respondents provided the following reasons: it was owed to the victims (50%), victims 
must be compensated (48%), justice must be done (17%), and those responsible must be punished (7%). 
 The alleged crimes for which perpetrators should be held accountable were deﬁned broadly. Nearly 
all respondents mentioned the killings and murder (91%), and over half mentioned theft, destruction 
(66%), and rape and sexual violence (52%). Fewer mentioned displacement (15%), forced recruitment 
of children (8%) and other crimes. Responses were similar across prefectures, except for rape and sex-
ual violence, which were mentioned by 63 percent of respondents in both Bangui and Ombella M’Poko, 
but less frequently in Lobaye (49%), Ouham Pende (49%), and even less frequently in Ouham (28%). 
28 Vinck P, Pham PN, Baldo S, Shigekane R, Living with Fear: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice 
and Social Reconstruction in Eastern Congo. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley; Payson Center for 
International Development, Tulane University; International Center for Transitional Justice, New York, 2008.
29 Pham PN, Vinck P, Stover E, Moss A, Wierda M, When the War Ends: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about 
Peace, Justice and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley; Payson 
Center for International Development, Tulane University; International Center for Transitional Justice, New York, 2007.
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 Respondents were further asked who, in their opinion, should be held accountable. They identi-
ﬁed a variety of actors reﬂecting the complex and varied nature of the conﬂicts in CAR. As with all 
previous questions in this survey, the questions were open-ended with no response option provided 
to the respondents; this permits respondents to provide any, and as many, responses as they want. 
Overall, most respondents pointed to members of the current or previous government: 39 percent 
said former president Ange-Félix Patassé should be held accountable, while current president François 
Bozizé was mentioned by 33 percent. Rebel groups, in general with no attribution to a speciﬁc name, 
were mentioned by 20 percent of the respondents, and the current government by 15 percent. There 
were important differences across prefectures, with the former president mentioned less frequently in 
the northern prefectures of Ouham and Ouham Pende, while the current president is most frequently 
mentioned in Ouham Pende. This reﬂects the increased manipulation of tribalism and regionalism for 
political gains.30
 Although the military has allegedly been involved in many crimes, few respondents mentioned the 
presidential / republican guard (GP/GR) and the Central African Armed Forces (FACA). This possibly 
means that respondents believe it is the government and politicians who are ultimately responsible 
for the violence rather than the military who carry out their orders and plans. Jean-Pierre Bemba, cur-
rently facing charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court, 
was mentioned by 13 percent of all the respondents. He was frequently mentioned in Ombella M’Poko 
(21%), Bangui (19%), and Lobaye (14%).
 Next, respondents were asked who, in their opinion, should be in charge of accountability mea-
sures. Although many respondents felt the government should be held accountable, nearly half the 
respondents (47%) also said that the government itself should be in charge of holding accountable 
30 International Crisis Group. Africa Report N°136: Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State. Nairobi/Brussels: 
ICG; 2007.
figure 18: crimes and accountability
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those responsible for the violence. In-depth interviews suggest that this response is associated with 
the formal judicial system, seen as part of the government. The national judicial system was directly 
mentioned by 24 percent of the respondents, and the same proportion (24%) said it should be the In-
ternational Criminal Court. 
 Since the courts were frequently mentioned as a way to deal with those responsible for the violence, 
the study further explored the type of judicial measures respondents would like to see implemented in 
CAR. When given four possible prosecution options, most respondents (52%) favored a trial in CAR by 
the national court system. The second choice was a trial in CAR by an international court (27%), while 
14 percent favored a trial outside of CAR by an international court. Only 7 percent favored no trials at all. 
 Questions relating to the national judicial sector will be explored in the next section. Before turn-
ing to questions about justice, however, respondents were asked a more general question about what 
should happen to those who committed the violence. The most common answers involved sanctions 
and punishment: 46 percent said they should confront justice and be tried by a court, 27 percent said 
they should be put in jail, 21 percent said they should be killed, and 19 percent said they should be 
figure 19: who should be held accountable?
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punished. Fewer said they should be forgiven (5%), ask for forgiveness (5%), and/or tell the truth about 
their actions (6%). 
 These data suggest that accountability and justice for grave crimes are important for the popula-
tion in CAR. The survey further suggests that respondents see those measures as important for peace. 
More than four out of ﬁve respondents believe it is impossible to have peace if impunity continues. 
THE MEANING OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE SECTOR
As outlined above, the national court system is frequently proposed as the avenue to hold accountable 
those responsible for the violence committed during the conﬂicts. Trials in CAR by a national court 
were the preferred trial option. A series of further questions was designed to assess respondents’ 
perception of the national judicial system. As in northern Uganda, DRC, Rwanda, and Cambodia, re-
spondents in CAR deﬁned justice in broad terms. When asked about the meaning of justice, they most 
frequently mentioned the strict application of the law (51%), the trial of those who committed crimes 
(31%), being just or fair (26%), and knowing who is right and who is wrong (17%).
 As the discussion on local conﬂict-resolution showed, few respondents interact with the national 
judicial system. Rather, most local conﬂicts are resolved by families themselves, village chiefs, or reli-
gious leaders. However, as many as 26 percent said they had had some sort of contact with the formal 
judicial system over the course of their lives. The type of contact was not discussed. When asked about 
their knowledge and opinion of the national judicial system, 37 percent of respondents reported having 
a good or very good knowledge of the system, and 34 percent judged its quality to be good or very good. 
Inversely, 33 percent judged their knowledge to be poor or very poor, and 36 percent judged the quality 
figure 21: what should happen to those 
responsible for the violence?
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of the judicial system to be bad or very bad. When probed further about their opinion, 46 percent of 
the respondents felt the national judicial system was good and doing its job. However, 39 percent said 
it was corrupt, 29 percent said justice is only for the rich because it is unfair to the poor, 25 percent said 
the judges and lawyers were not doing their jobs, and 9 percent said criminals remain unpunished. As 
many as 32 percent of respondents reported knowing directly of unfair imprisonment, and 28 percent 
reported knowing of corrupt lawyers and/or judges.  
FORGIVENESS AND REVENGE
Despite what appears to be a strong demand for accountability and some form of punishment, a ma-
jority of respondents (61%) say it is possible to forgive those responsible for the violence. In fact, 44 
percent said they had already forgiven at least some of those responsible. Nevertheless, in order for for-
giveness to take place, most respondents said those responsible should ﬁrst apologize (40%), confess 
the truth (37%), change their behavior (31%), show remorse (27%), be punished (16%), or compensate 
the victims for their losses (12%). As the range of responses illustrates, forgiveness does not come 
easily. While many respondents said it is possible to forgive and some report already having forgiven 
at least some of the perpetrators, they also report frequently having feelings of hatred for those who 
committed the violence (57%). Over one in four respondents (27%) indicated they would seek revenge 
if given the opportunity. This illustrates the complex relationship among accountability, forgiveness, 
and desire for revenge. They are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive. 
The International Criminal Court 
At the time of the survey, the ICC was just beginning its outreach activities in the interior of the coun-
try.31 The Court had concentrated its activities on the capital, Bangui, and few outreach activities had 
been conducted in the prefectures of Lobaye and Ombella M’Poko. Overall, one third of respondents 
31 An in-depth discussion and analysis of results about the ICC is discussed in a forthcoming article: Vinck P, Pham PN. 
Outreach Evaluation: The International Criminal Court in the Central African Republic (forthcoming).
figure 22: knowledge and perception of 
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reported having heard about the ICC. Awareness was highest in Bangui (63%) probably because of 
better access to media, higher levels of education, and outreach by the Court. In Ombella M’Poko and 
Lobaye, 35 percent and 24 percent of the respondents respectively had heard about the ICC.32 The high 
level of awareness in Ombella M’Poko may be explained by a relatively better access to media (espe-
cially in the areas bordering Bangui), as well as an interest in the proceedings against Bemba, alleg-
edly responsible for violence that took place in the prefecture. Not surprisingly, given the nature of the 
outreach activities and the scope of the case currently considered by the ICC, awareness about the ICC 
was lowest in Ouham Pende (11%) and Ouham (7%). The two prefectures have poor access to media, 
have not been targeted for outreach, and are experiencing ongoing conﬂict. 
 Respondents who indicated having heard about the ICC were asked a series of follow-up questions 
to judge their knowledge and perception of the court. The following results are only among those who in-
dicated having heard about the ICC. 
 Respondents who had heard about the ICC were asked to rate their knowledge of the court. About 
two out of ﬁve respondents (42%) ranked their knowledge as good or very good, 34 percent ranked 
their knowledge as average, and 24 percent ranked it as poor or very poor. In Ouham and Ouham 
Pende, the proportion of respondents ranking their knowledge as good or very good is above 50 per-
cent, which may be due to the fact that few have heard about the ICC and those who did are likely to 
have a strong interest in learning more about it. 
 Radio was the most frequent source of information about the ICC: 90 percent mentioned it among 
their main sources, far more frequently than friends and community (14%), newspapers (12%), or the 
television (12%). Television and newspapers, however, were almost exclusively mentioned in Bangui, 
32 In comparison, awareness about the ICC in northern Uganda increased from 25% in 2005 to 60% in 2007. In eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 28% of the population had heard about the ICC in 2007. See Vinck et al. and Pham et 
al. op cited. 
figure 23: knowledge and awareness about the icc
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while in the other prefectures “friends and community” played a more important role. This is consis-
tent with the more general data on access to mass media.
 Less than 2 percent of those interviewed reported having participated in a meeting about the ICC, 
the majority of them (77%) having participated in only one meeting. However, more than half of those 
who had heard about the ICC reported talking at least occasionally about it with friends or neighbors 
(57%), and 51 percent indicated actively looking for information about the Court.
 Two objectives of the ICC’s outreach activities are to (1) raise awareness among affected commu-
nities regarding the role, mandate, functioning, and activities of the ICC, and (2) ensure the media 
has rapid access to accurate information regarding judicial proceedings and ICC news for further 
dissemination to the general public in CAR. Several questions were designed to evaluate respondents’ 
knowledge about the ICC. With regard to the creation of the Court, about half the respondents (47%) 
believed the ICC was established by the international community, while others believed it had been 
established by the European community (23%), the U.S. (8%), or CAR (5%). Some were able to identify 
its date of creation: 23 percent said 2002 and 8 percent said 1998. A larger majority knew where the 
Court itself was located: 61 percent indicated the Hague or the Netherlands. About the same proportion 
(65%) knew the Court had ofﬁces in CAR, but among them, just 38 percent reported knowing how to 
access it. 
 With regard to misinformation, overall few respondents believed the court has been created to in-
vestigate crimes committed in CAR only (16% believed so) or in Africa only (22%). However, two-thirds 
(65%) of those who had heard about the ICC believed the court could investigate crimes committed 
before 2002. (In fact, the ICC can only investigate crimes committed after July 1, 2002, which means 
that crimes committed prior to that date in CAR are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court.) 
 Awareness and knowledge about the court is associated with the investigation into serious crimes 
committed in CAR. When asked about who is currently in detention, 80 percent of those who had 
heard about the ICC were able to identify Jean-Pierre Bemba. Bemba has indeed been charged with 
three counts of war crimes and two counts of crimes against humanity, all allegedly committed in CAR. 
A minority of the respondents was able to identify Lubanga (3%), Katanga (2%) or Ngudjolo Chui (1%) 
who are in detention for crimes allegedly committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, 
a larger percentage (10%) mistakenly mentioned Charles Taylor, who is on trial at the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone.
figure 24: icc – sources of information
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 When asked which countries are being investigated by the ICC, respondents accurately mentioned 
CAR (64%), the DRC (59%), Sudan (35%), and/or Uganda (12%). However, 30 percent also mentioned 
other countries, and only 5 percent were able to provide four correct answers (i.e., name all four situ-
ations). Finally, when asked about individuals who were subject to an arrest warrant, Bashir was most 
frequently mentioned (39%); followed by Bemba (31%), who is already under arrest; and Kony (16%). 
However, 21 percent also inaccurately believed an arrest warrant had been issued for CAR’s former 
President Ange-Félix Patassé.33
 Overall perceptions of the Court are positive. Nearly all respondents who had heard about the ICC 
believe it is important (95%) because there is a need for justice (51%), because those responsible must 
be punished (20%), to compensate the victims (10%) or for other reasons. Most (91%) also believe 
the ICC will have an impact in CAR. Those who believe so most frequently said the ICC would bring 
justice (27%), help prevent future crimes (20%), help establish the truth about what happened (19%), 
punish those responsible (14%), help victims (9%), and bring peace (8%). Most respondents (90%) 
further found the ICC to be just and neutral. Among those who did not believe the ICC to be neutral 
(10%), respondents generally felt the ICC was working with the government (34%), and that it is after 
only one group (18%). 
 The positive perception about the ICC likely explains why most respondents (92%) would be will-
ing to participate in ICC-related activities if possible. Most believed it is indeed possible for victims to 
participate in ICC proceedings (91%). Most of those willing to participate wanted to provide testimony 
(80%), participate as a victim (16%), or in other capacities (4%). 
Measures for Victims
To understand what affected populations may expect, if anything, from accountability and justice mea-
sures, we asked a general question about what should be done for the victims of the conﬂicts in CAR. 
The most frequent answers were related to reparation and/or restitution for their losses: 60 percent 
suggested that victims should be restituted what they have lost as a result of the conﬂicts, 34 percent 
said they should receive money, 33 percent said they should receive individual compensation (un-
speciﬁed), and 25 percent said they should receive services such as health care and education. Fewer 
respondents mentioned accountability and justice as measures that should be taken for victims: 12 
percent said those responsible should be punished, and 10 percent said their suffering should be ac-
knowledged. This, however, does not mean that justice is not important to the victims, as we will see in 
the next sections. Rather, it points to the wide range of needs expressed by the respondents.
 While the question of what should be done for victims was asked in general terms, it is important 
to note that 65 percent of the population deﬁned themselves as victims. This occurs most frequently 
in the northern prefectures, Ouham (78%) and Ouham Pende (92%). Respondents provided several 
33 Ange-Félix Patassé invited Bemba and his MLC troops to help put down a coup in 2002. Crimes alledgedly committed 
by Bemba’s troops during that period are investigated by the ICC.
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rationales as to why they considered themselves as victims. They most often reported having lived in 
conﬂict-affected areas during periods of violence (59%); having property, animals or land stolen or 
destroyed (29%); having lost family members (28%); and having directly experienced physical violence 
(25%). The responses are consistent with data on exposure to violence reported in this study. 
 More generally, when asked who the victims of the conﬂicts are, a majority of respondents (75%) 
identiﬁed the whole civilian population, while many also identiﬁed speciﬁc groups including women 
(54%), children (46%), and the elderly (25%). 
REPARATIONS
When asked what should be done for victims in the previous section, interviewers made no reference 
to reparations, justice, or accountability. However, the general question was followed by a series of 
questions on reparations, deﬁned as the ensemble of measures that can be taken for victims. Further-
more, when asked speciﬁcally about the importance of providing reparations, most respondents (97%) 
reported it was important. They further explained that reparation was important because it would help 
victims recover from their losses (54%), because victims are poor and need the assistance (34%), be-
cause it would help victims mentally to forget about what happened (30%), because it would serve as 
recognition of their suffering (28%), and that it would help bring peace (23%). 
 Then, respondents were asked again what should be done for victims but with a speciﬁc reference 
to reparations. Responses were somewhat similar to the more general question regarding what should 
be done for victims: 54 percent said they should be restituted what they have lost, 41 percent said to give 
money, 30 percent said to give individual compensation, and 26 percent mentioned improving services 
including health care and education. 
figure 25: measures for victims
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 Respondents said most frequently that such reparations should be provided at both the individual 
and community levels (43%), while 37 percent said it should be at the community level, and 20 percent 
said it should be at the individual level. However, about half the respondents (47%) said they would 
accept only community-level reparations. More were willing to accept only symbolic reparations (56%), 
but only 13 percent were willing to accept no reparations at all. 
Who should receive reparations? Total
(% yes)
Would you accept it if only community-level 
reparations were provided for victims? 
47%
Would you accept it if only symbolic 
reparations were provided for victims?
56%
Would you accept it if no reparations were 
provided for victims?
13%
 A majority of respondents (79%) attached importance to the person or organization who should 
pay for the reparations. They generally said it should be the government (35%) or the international 
community (31%). Some mentioned the International Criminal Court (9%), the president (7%), and 
those responsible for the violence themselves (6%). 
figure 26: why is it important to provide reparations?
figure 27: reparations
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Bangui Lobaye Ombella 
M’Poko
Ouham Ouham 
Pende 
Total
Government 30% 46% 36% 39% 31%
International 
community
35% 24% 27% 28% 35%
ICC 15% 5% 11% 5% 6%
President 2% 7% 6% 13% 11%
Those responsible 7% 7% 9% 7% 1%
Local community 6% 5% 5% 3% 2%
Patasse 1% 2% 1% 1% 4%
Other 5% 2% 3% 4% 6%
Don’t know 1% 2% 3% 1% 4%
Truth-Seeking and Memorialization
As shown in our other research in Cambodia, DRC, Iraq, and northern Uganda, it is important for ci-
vilians affected by violence to know what happened during the conﬂict and why. In CAR, 89 percent of 
respondents said it is important to know what happened. They most frequently say it is important be-
cause the truth must be known (58%), to understand why the conﬂicts and violence happened (42%), 
and to know who is responsible (35%). 
 A majority of the population (80%) was willing to talk openly and publicly about what they or their 
family have experienced. Most of them were willing to do so because they felt they owed it to them-
selves (37%), because it was their duty (26%), or so those responsible would be known and identiﬁed 
(25%). Those who said they were not willing to talk openly about their experience most frequently said 
it was because they were afraid of reprisals (38%), because it was not their role (29%), because they did 
not want to remember the past (13%), or because they had nothing to say (10%). 
 While establishing the truth about what happened is a common demand, there is much debate 
on how this can best be achieved, and on the role of memorialization. This study did not discuss such 
processes, but respondents were nevertheless asked whether they believed memorials were important. 
A majority answered positively (74%). Among them, they generally said memorials were important so 
the past could not be easily forgotten (55%), memorials would pay respect to the victims (39%), educate 
the youth (32%), provide recognition of the violence (16%), and help explain what happened (12%). 
 Among those who did not believe memorials were important (26%), they generally felt that the 
community should forget (44%) and that it would bring back bad memories (44%). About one in four 
(26%) also said such memorials would be useless because the past is already known.
figure 28: who should pay for reparations?
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Memorials are important (74%) – Why? Memorials are not important (26%) – Why?
figure 29: memorials
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CONCLUSIONS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS
THESE KEY SURVEY RESULTS should be instructive to the Government of the Central African Repub-
lic, nongovernmental organizations, and other agencies as they develop policies to address the legacy 
of armed conﬂict in CAR. They are also a reminder that consulting the population and deepening our 
understanding of war-affected communities is essential to build a lasting peace. 
The key recommendations to emerge from this study are:
To the CAR Government and Armed Groups:
 •  Work together to implement the goals of the Inclusive Political Dialogue, including the effective 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants back into society, and hold free 
and fair presidential elections. The citizens of CAR view combatant reintegration programs and 
elections as integral steps for building a lasting peace. 
 •  Stop preying on the population and collecting illegal taxes at road blocks. These instill fear 
among the population, which hinders their ability to carry on with their daily lives. 
To the CAR Government:
 •  Reform the security sector and remove perpetrators of serious crimes from their positions. The 
police and gendarmes must be trained and supported to fulﬁll their mandate of protecting—not 
preying on—civilians.
 •  Bring those responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law to 
justice. The government should support the judiciary to ensure that courts can operate indepen-
dently and fairly. This will help raise public conﬁdence in the judiciary and support the rule of law. 
 •  Prioritize the provision of basic services including education, health care, and transportation 
(e.g., road network).  
To the Civil Society and the International Community:
 •  Pressure the government, political parties, and armed groups to ensure that elections and DDR 
processes are effectively implemented in a transparent, free, and fair manner. 
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 •  Provide sufﬁcient ﬁnancial and technical support to the electoral process to guarantee free and 
fair elections and ensure a peaceful transition. 
 •  Work with the government to rebuild infrastructure and services and uphold the rule of law. 
The focus on humanitarian needs in the north should not prevent investment to address struc-
tural and chronic poverty in all of CAR. Respondents identiﬁed peace, employment, and basic 
services as priorities. If any of these are neglected, political and physical stability will be hard to 
establish and sustain. 
 •  Engage with the population to address domestic violence and other forms of violence at the 
community level.
 •  Continue to document violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and 
press for accountability. The international community should continue to support civil society 
in its efforts to document human rights abuses and assist victims. The international commu-
nity should also maintain a UN peacekeeping mission in CAR for the foreseeable future. Its 
presence will help guarantee a certain level of stability and allow for the completion of DDR, 
elections, and reform of the security sector.
 •  Work to develop a regional security strategy to address cross-border issues and lawless border 
zones. 
To the International Criminal Court:
 •  Continue and increase public information and outreach activities especially in the interior of 
the country. The proportion of respondents who are aware of the ICC was relatively high, but 
there is still a great need to target groups with little or no access to media.
 •  Reconsider holding in situ proceedings in CAR, security condition permitting. The survey found 
strong support for local trials. 
 •  Broaden the scope of investigations to include serious crimes committed throughout the coun-
try, especially in the north. 
 •  Work with national institutions to ensure the investigation contributes to establishing a histori-
cal record of the events in CAR. 
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